Greek Orthodox Education: What it means to us

By Metropolitan Sotirios

When we speak of "Greek Orthodox Education", we speak of dignity and self-respect. Respect towards our forebearers. Love and devotion that  our motherland deserves. Insight in to the future. A serious and premeditated contemplation of what lies ahead, in order for that which we value most to be maintained and never lost:  our language; our race; our culture; and above all, the Truth of Christ as revealed in our Holy Orthodox Faith.

Looking at the global atlas today, Greece is a very small country. Although a small country, it has a glorious history with an unparalleled culture. A country that illumined the entire world with the light of knowledge. What other country in the world can take pride in having such an ancient and glorious culture? For including in its children, such great personalities as Homer, Socrates and Plato?  To read such wisdom and rich depth of meaning and as well as the wonderful use of the Greek language in their written works?

Globalization comes with both positive and negative attributes. With its technological progress and the rapid expansion and use of the Internet (especially within the Mass Media), the whole world has become a small village or a global neighbourhood. With the spread of globalization - although not realized by many - a serious struggle has erupted. It is the fight for the preservation of ideas, of cultures and languages. At this point, it does not seem that one language will prevail to become the only language used by humanity; however, if it did, why should it not be the Greek language, which is the most correct and most logical, according to glossologists?

  Those of us who have left our mother country came to Canada for various reasons. It is not necessary to dwell on these reasons now. We must always remember the moment that we made our decision to leave Greece and the blessing our mother gave us as we departed. Let us remember our thoughts at that time, and the promises we made at that moment.

The problems that our motherland Greece faces today are known to all. The greatest problem it faces is not a financial one, as most people believe. The greatest problem is the selfishness exhibited by many, with a “me-first” attitude that poisons relationships. This is manifested in many ways:  by the lack of love and devotion towards our Motherland; the lack of respect towards our forebearers; the lack of self-respect and propriety.

Both the Greek Academics and the Greek Mass Media –of course not all of them- who both should serve as the protectors of the authenticity and purity of the Greek language, allow for it to be tainted. Not only do they allow it to be tainted, they also contaminate it themselves by borrowing and using many non-Greek words and expressions. We see and hear them every day on our television sets, in the programs that reach even the most remote countries of the Greek diaspora.

When you see and hear this in the Greek Mass Media, how can you retain the new generation, our children, within the Greek culture? When you are laden with the great task - to teach them the Greek language, the Orthodox Faith, love towards the Motherland, and respect towards the forebearers - one cannot help but feel like Sisyphus, who was compelled to roll an immense boulder up a hill, only to watch it roll back down, and to repeat this action forever.

This sermon today expresses agony. It rings the proverbial siren that there is danger ahead. It calls both young and old to be on the alert. We must all work together. Not merely for the maintenance, but for the preservation of the Greek language and culture.  Especially for the preservation of the light of Orthodoxy, which personifies the Truth of Christ on earth.

Our voice is small and quiet. Quite possibly, it will not be heard by those who should hear it. You, though, who are Greek-Canadians, should stay true to that which you were taught and that which you learned. Remember that which you promised your parents as you left your Motherland – that you would remain forever Greek in culture and Orthodox in faith. Keep alive and live your Orthodoxy. Maintain and speak your Greek language. Take care to teach it to your children, grandchildren and descendents. Only in this way will you show true love to your heritage and to the unparalleled country of Greece. This is how you will show respect towards your forebearers, to those who were glorified and who continue to glorify you as Greeks today. This is how your will show respect to yourself and both love and respect to your descendents.

Greek Orthodox Christians of Canada: do not be decieved by the loud sirens of this world. Keep your Orthodox Christian identity. Maintain and raise your children and descendents in the Greek Orthodox faith and Church. In this way, you will not only glorify your country of origin, but you will continue to serve as lights that illumine the world. You will be walking in the right direction, ascending the heights toward Christ, who grants us His Truth and Salvation.  Be careful, so that you do not become weary on this meaningful journey, and fall by the wayside. The victory is yours to attain. I wish you every success in achieving this goal.

With fatherly love and fervent prayers,

Metropolitan Archbishop Sotirios

Head of the Greek Orthodox Church in Canada

Ombudsman criticises Commission's refusal to disclose documents on UK opt-out from Charter of Fundamental Rights

Ombudsman criticises Commission's refusal to disclose documents on UK opt-out from Charter of Fundamental Rights

The European Ombudsman, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, has strongly criticised the European Commission's refusal to give access to documents concerning its view of the UK opt-out from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This follows a complaint from the European Citizen Action Service (ECAS), a Brussels-based NGO, which wanted to find out why UK citizens do not enjoy the same fundamental rights as other EU citizens. The Commission rejected the Ombudsman's recommendation that it disclose the documents, without giving adequate reasons.

Commission refused access to documents without giving valid reasons

ECAS lodged a complaint with the Ombudsman about the Commission's refusal to give access to five documents, drafted by its services and concerning the UK opt-out from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The opt-out was a major issue in the intergovernmental negotiations leading to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the documents were prepared by the Commission in that context.

The Commission explained its refusal by referring to the need to protect both the legal advice it receives, as well as its internal decision-making process.

After inspecting the documents in question, the Ombudsman concluded that the Commission's arguments for non-disclosure were not convincing.

Mr Diamandouros stated: "Public access to documents concerning how EU law is adopted is key to winning the trust of European citizens. I therefore strongly regret the Commission's refusal to give the public appropriate access to documents concerning how one of the most important EU laws, namely, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, was adopted".

Despite the Ombudsman's recommendation that it make the documents in question public, the Commission only gave partial access. As access to documents is itself one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter, and as the Commission failed substantively to engage with certain of his arguments, the Ombudsman concluded that such refusal constituted "a most serious instance of maladministration".

Intervention by Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the ECB, China-Europe Economists Symposium, Beijing, 12 January 2013

Ladies and gentleman,
First of all, let me extend my thanks to David Marsh and OMFIF for inviting me to this symposium today. There are many themes on the relationship between China and Europe that we could fruitfully discuss but I would like to focus my remarks today on the euro area and the evolution of the sovereign debt crisis. In particular, I would like to review the key lessons from the experience of the last 5 years – and how these lessons have been incorporated into Europe’s response to the crisis.

1. Lessons of the crisis

Let me begin with that first question: what have we learned about the euro area in the past 5 years? In my view, there are three main lessons.
First, the financial crisis demonstrated - quite compellingly - that financial contagion is the flip side of European financial market integration. We have learned that deep financial integration, without a commensurate deeper integration of financial stability policies is unstable.
This potential vulnerability has been characterized by Dirk Schoenmaker as a “financial trilemma”: the three objectives of european financial integration, european financial stability and national supervision of banks cannot be achieved at the same time.
The existence of this trilemma was confirmed in the euro area experience. Indeed, as it happened, enormous capital inflows channelled by banks of core countries to banks in the periphery allowed for large financial imbalances in the public and private sectors of recipient countries. When these flows turned into outflows as the economic environment deteriorated after 2008, these imbalances not only led to problems for the countries concerned but also produced contagion to other parts of the euro area.
Financial stability - we have seen - is a common good and as such requires shared responsibility for its preservation. A single mechanism for financial supervision and a common authority with strong tools for bank resolution – could have more easily dealt with the situation.
Second, we have learned that shock absorbers at the national level are insufficient in the face of a major financial and economic crisis. Hence the European level has an important role to play.
The design of the euro area assumed that stabilisation would take place at the national level and to a large extent automatically. Stabilisation would be provided by national fiscal policies that would respond to idiosyncratic national conditions. Accordingly, a fiscal brake at the EU level, codified in the Stability and Growth Pact, was designed to prevent fiscal profligacy, preserve fiscal space and hence allow automatic stabilisers to play out in full during downturns. Moreover, country-specific shocks were expected to become ever less important as the euro would spur market integration and the flexible single market to allow an easy and fast rebalancing after such shocks.
However, the scale of the shock after the 2008 financial crisis was unprecedented in a number of countries and it far exceeded their national shock absorption capacity. The euro area had no mechanisms to provide financial support for countries in difficulty and stave off cross-border contagion; there were no area-level institutions to prevent governments from being pulled down by their domestic banking systems. This underscored the pitfalls of a design that relies exclusively on the national level to fulfil the stabilization function.
Third, we have learned that governance of economic policies at the EU level has to be broader and deeper than anticipated prior to the crisis.
Besides fiscal surveillance, which essentially focused on public deficits, ^[1] there was believed to be no need to closely monitor macroeconomic imbalances and disequilibria on the labour, product or financial markets. Disequilibria originating from the private sector were supposed to be only short-lived and eliminated by market forces.
The data clearly show that this was insufficient. Between 1999 and 2007, the ratio of public debt to GDP in EMU declined on average by 5.6 percentage points. The improvement was by large the result of favourable economic conditions rather than concrete fiscal consolidation measures which should have aimed at approaching the reference value of a 60% GDP to debt ratio at a satisfactory pace, as the Treaty prescribes it. In some countries – as we all know - the sovereign debt dynamics were much less favourable than the euro area average. Nevertheless, the accumulated private sector imbalances seem to have far exceeded those in the public sector.
In the same period - between 1999 and 2007 - the ratio of private sector debt to GDP increased by 26.8 percentage points. Also for the same period, in the stressed countries, the cumulative increase in the private debt ratio to GDP versus the public debt ratio, amounted respectively, to 49 and 24 per cent for Portugal, 75 and minus 35 per cent for Spain, 101 and minus 10 per cent for Ireland, 217 and 4 per cent for Greece. In 2007, at the beginning of the crisis, the public debt ratio was just 62.7% in Portugal, 46.4% in Spain and 26.6% in Ireland, in all cases well below the euro area average.
Nevertheless, the increase in total debt, both public and private, was associated with various destabilizing developments, ranging from rising asset prices to losses of wage and price competitiveness. Clearly, the euro area needed a framework to monitor macroeconomic imbalances and suffered from its absence.

2. Responses to the crisis

So how has Europe incorporated these lessons into its policy responses to the crisis?
It is useful to conceive of the European response in two phases. First, Europe has had to respond to what might be called the acute challenges, by which I mean the shifts in investor sentiment and market psychology that have led to market panic and cross-border contagion. These had to be addressed to manage the on-going crisis.
Second, it has had to respond to the systemic aspects of the crisis, by which I mean the underlying economic and institutional weaknesses that have led these acute effects to appear. These have to be addressed to find a sustainable solution to the crisis and prevent a re-emergence.

a. Acute challenges

The acute challenges have been addressed, first and foremost, by establishing crisis management tools at the European level. This included the temporary European Financial Stability Facility and Mechanism in May 2010 and more recently the permanent European Stability Mechanism. Their significance cannot be overstated. Financial support can now be given swiftly and efficiently, conditional on strong macroeconomic adjustment. This arrangement maintains the core principle that Member States are responsible for their economic policies, while at the same time removing the tail risk of a self-fulfilling liquidity/solvency crisis. This partly remedies the lack of a ‘federal’ shock absorber, while not altering the fundamental balance of competencies within the euro area, which would require fundamental Treaty changes. The capacity of these arrangements also ensures sufficient scope for support. The ESM is a permanent institution that can raise up to 500 billion euros in financial markets – actually, one of the world’s largest and most flexible international financial institutions.

b. Systemic challenges

As regards the systemic aspects of the crisis – the underlying economic and institutional challenges that lie at the heart of Europe’s current difficulties – reforms have taken place on two main levels.
First, Member States have undertaken major internal and external adjustments to reduce fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances. Encouragingly, it is those Member States with the deepest vulnerabilities that have undertaken the most far-reaching adjustments.
For instance, on the fiscal side, Greece has closed its structural primary budget deficit by around 13 percentage points of GDP since 2009, Portugal by almost 7.5 pp, Ireland by around 6.5 pp, and Spain by more than 4.5 pp. This compares with an average reduction in the structural primary deficit of 2.6 pp for the euro area.
The competitiveness losses these countries accumulated over the first decade of EMU are also being tackled. From October 2008 to Jun 2012, unit labour costs decreased in Ireland relative to the euro area average by around 19%, around 12% in Greece, 10% in Spain, and by around 6% in Portugal. The internal rebalancing within the euro area is underway.
Current account positions have also improved. The three countries under full EU-IMF programmes have current account deficits that are on average around 8 percentage points of GDP lower than they were in 2008 and are approaching full balance or even in surplus as in the case of Ireland. This rebalancing is not just the results of declining imports associate with a recessionary period but are the consequence of a great increase in exports that in the case of Portugal and Spain exceeded the European average since 2009. The second level on which fundamental reforms have taken place to address underlying weaknesses is the strengthening of the institutional architecture of the euro area.
Fiscal governance has been strengthened on several occasions. Very recently, 25 EU countries signed up to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, known as the European Fiscal Compact, and which entered into force in the beginning of this year. Member States commit to run structurally balanced budgets and introduce a respective fiscal rule into their national primary legislation. Additional regulations have strengthened the European fiscal governance framework, of which the final pieces – the so-called “two-pack” – will significantly add to the fiscal rule book for euro area countries. It will be important to have the new rules fully implemented and complied with. This should give credibility to fiscal policies, hence reducing investor concerns about fiscal sustainability.
The absence of any oversight framework for macroeconomic policies has been redressed through the creation of a dedicated procedure for the monitoring of macroeconomic imbalances such as excessive credit growth or exuberant house price increases. In addition, a new idea of “reform contracts” will be explored further next year, by which Member States would commit to specific measures to boost competitiveness and receive targeted financial support from the euro area in return.

c. Towards a Banking Union

However, the most significant governance development has been the commitment to create a real banking union in the euro area – to resolve the “financial trilemma” I referred to at the beginning of my remarks. Its first component is the elevation of supervisory responsibilities to the European level.
In mid-December last year, the Finance Ministers of the EU Member States unanimously reached an agreement on the legislative framework for a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) through the attribution of banking supervision tasks to the ECB. This legislative framework is expected to be enacted in the course of the first quarter of this year.
The agreement on the SSM is a milestone in European integration, with no precedent in monetary union historical experiences. Member States have agreed to assign to the European level a full and complete set of banking supervision powers over all banks of the euro area Member States and also over the banks of the EU countries wishing to join the SSM. The supervisory powers range from authorisation, Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 tasks to early intervention and sanctioning powers. Furthermore, the SSM will also have responsibilities regarding macro-prudential supervision of the euro area financial system as a whole also of individual countries, which is a necessary complement for both central banking and banking supervisory policy, as the crisis has taught us.
The establishment of the SSM is essential for the functioning of Monetary Union. The independent supranational supervision by the SSM will help to restore confidence in the banking sector. This should reverse the trend towards financial fragmentation, prevent flows of deposits due to the lack of confidence, and help restart a well-functioning interbank market.
It is also a major step for the single financial market. The SSM will simplify supervision and support the development of a single rulebook by the European Banking Authority, while helping to better address systemic risks in Europe.
The Single Supervisory Mechanism, although very important, is only the first step towards a banking union. The next step is the establishment of a Single Resolution Mechanism – a necessary complement to the SSM. Building on a strong legislative framework on bank recovery and resolution (which is under preparation) such a Single Resolution Mechanism, with a Single Resolution Authority at its centre, is essential to enable timely and impartial resolution decisions focused on the European dimension and to minimise resolution costs. It will contribute to breaking the vicious bank-sovereign nexus and minimize the risk of supervisory forbearance in the absence of workable resolution options. The European Commission will present a proposal in the course of the year.
As you can see Europe has responded decisively to the challenges. Member states have progressed individually in rebalancing their economies and in common in strengthening the union’s institutions.
Notwithstanding the achievements made, no time should be wasted in complacency. Continued policy actions are necessary to sustain confidence and revive the growth potential of euro area countries. The imperative is to further reduce fiscal and structural imbalances as well as to advance with financial sector restructuring and with European institution building. Additional progress on those reform fronts will send a strong signal to markets.

d. The monetary policy response

Let me also briefly touch upon the response of monetary policy. As you know, our primary objective is to maintain price stability in the euro area. Neither our mandate nor our resolve to deliver on it has changed in the face of the crisis.
However, the range of instruments we use to achieve price stability had to be widened. The crisis severely damaged the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and thus changes in the ECB’s key interest rates could not be transmitted uniformly across the euro area. Moreover, the sources of disruption in the transmission varied over time. Hence, we used different types of non-standard measures as the crisis evolved: we provided liquidity in fixed-rate, full allotment mode, considerably extended the maturity of central bank credit, widened the eligible collateral set, bought government and covered bonds outright and reduced reserve requirements.
This is also the case for the last measure we announced: the Outright Monetary Transactions – OMTs. The OMTs are designed to tackle unfounded fears of the reversibility of the euro that distorted the sovereign bond markets in the euro area. The perceived redenomination risk had led to a fragmentation of financial markets along national borders and jeopardised the singleness of our monetary policy. Thus, the OMTs were designed as a credible backstop to self-reinforcing negative market expectations and has been successful in alleviating some of the acute crisis challenges I have alluded to before.
Yet, they were also designed to preserve incentives for prudent economic policies. The ECB will only intervene in government bond markets for countries that are subject to effective conditionality of certain ESM programmes – thereby re-enforcing also the resolution of the systemic challenges I mentioned before. The credibility in the eyes of the market of the OMT as a backstop certainly underpins the significant improvement of sovereign bonds’ yields and spreads since the beginning of August, when the ECB’s Governing Council took the decision to create the programme.

3. Conclusion

The global financial crisis – more than 5 years on now – exposed several structural deficiencies in the institutional set-up of the euro area. However, the lessons learned now translate into policy action. The Euro area has been making progress in all domains of the necessary response to the crisis: countries have been successfully applying adjustment programs; financial backstops have been created; monetary policy has delivered in its role of liquidity provision to the banking sector and Member States have started an ambitious programme of institutional reforms that is deepening European integration and improving the framework for monetary union.
Once again we can see the wisdom of one of the founding fathers of the European project, Jean Monnet, when he wrote: “Men only act in a state of necessity and usually only recognise necessity in a situation of crisis”.
Once again, European countries have shown their resolve in making the euro a success and reaffirmed the deep political commitment to work together towards a stronger union.

EU must require "made in" labels on imports from third countries, say MEPs

The EU must make the use of "made in" origin labels on goods imported from third countries mandatory, MEPs reiterated in a plenary debate and vote on Thursday. They objected to the Commission's plans simply to withdraw the proposed "made in" regulation, which was strongly backed by Parliament in 2010, and asked it either to change its mind or to table an alternative.


Since member states have failed, to agree on mandatory origin labels for goods such as clothing, shoes, jewellery and glassware imported from third countries, the Commission must find other ways to level the playing field for EU manufacturers and their third country competitors, say MEPs. Only mandatory "made in" labelling enables buyers to make informed choices.

No double standards

In the debate, MEPs pointed out that countries such as Brazil, China and the USA do have compulsory origin marking schemes for imports of these goods.

"We cannot have double standards in globalized market. We must ensure that the rules are fair, for our citizens, consumers and manufacturers", said Cristiana Muscardini (ECR, IT) who led Parliament's co-legislative work on the "made-in" proposal.

International Trade Committee chair Vital Moreira, (S&D, PT) pointed out that the initial goal had been "to prevent the use of false or misleading labels, so as to put us on an equal footing with our trade partners".

Stop the cover-up

Other MEPs cited the "particular interest" of multinationals in "some big EU countries" in using "misleading or no claims of origin to cover up environmental and social dumping". Failure to impose "made-in" labelling would be a "setback for consumer rights" and a "missed opportunity to protect jobs in Europe", they said.

Try again

Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht said that after seven years' work on the "made-in" rules, the Commission had to admit that "this legislation is set for failure" and it was "very clear that it is not going to find a majority in the Council".

The Commission should nonetheless table a revised text on "made in" labelling, in line with recent WTO rules, to enable consumers to make informed choices,  says the resolution.

Parliament backs free access to EU market for four African countries

Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles and Zimbabwe will get duty- and quota-free access to the EU market, under the EU's first economic partnership deal, endorsed by Parliament on Thursday, with an African region.


The Interim Economic Partnership Agreement (IEPA) with the Eastern and Southern Africa region will enable the four countries to sell their goods (most importantly coffee, sugar cane and tobacco) in the EU without paying tariffs or quotas. In return they will gradually open up their markets to EU exports over 15 years.

Parliament granted its consent to the EPA with 494 votes in favour, 97 against and 33 abstentions.

"This interim agreement, the first step towards a final one, should improve conditions and foster regional integration in the long run. The four countries fully support it, and I am confident that there was no pressure from the EU. As to Zimbabwe's human rights record, I agree that the final EPA must include a binding rule on human rights, but at this interim stage we are focusing on economic matters", said rapporteur Daniel Caspary (EPP, DE).

The EPA is intended to help integrate the four countries into the world economy, promote their sustainable development and reduce poverty. The four countries have also agreed to cooperate closely among themselves to foster regional integration.

This EPA is the first such deal actually to be implemented, as the four countries were the first to complete all the necessary steps.

It has applied provisionally since 14 May 2012, but still needs to be ratified by the four African countries and all EU member states to formally enter into force.

Zimbabwe: human rights concerns

MEPs accompanied the consent vote with a resolution stating their concerns that "certain policies present a threat to future economic relations between the Union and Zimbabwe".

They condemn abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Zimbabwe, and in particular harassment of human rights defenders, journalists and members of civil society.  MEPs fear that Zimbabwe might not be ready for such agreement and stress that the EU should never be flexible on human rights issues. Some said a binding rule on human rights should be included even at this interim stage.

MEPs call on the EU delegation in Harare to help Zimbabwe to improve its human rights record, with a view to holding peaceful and credible elections "in line with the standards the EU would expect of any of its trading partners".

Parliament backs historic EU partnership agreement with Iraq

MEPs backed the EU's first-ever partnership deal with Iraq on Thursday, aimed at helping it complete the transition to democracy, rebuild and normalise relations with the international community. In a separate resolution, MEPs raise concerns about continuing violence and human rights abuses in Iraq and call for a stronger EU presence there.


The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) will boost ties in a range of areas, from trade and investment to development. The non-preferential trade agreement, in force provisionally since 1 August 2012, includes basic trade cooperation rules to help Iraq prepare for eventual WTO accession.
"The PCA is a symbol of the EU's determination to play an important role in Iraq's transition. We must however match our political ambitions and the strategic stakes involved with the human and financial resources needed," said the rapporteur, Mario Mauro (EPP, IT).

Under the renewable 10-year deal signed on 11 May 2012 and now endorsed by the House, ministers will meet each year to review progress with peace, democracy and the rule of law. The EU will also help Iraq accede to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
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The agreement also promotes human rights and fundamental freedoms and seeks to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons.

MEPs backed the deal by a big majority in a show of hands.

National reconciliation paramount

In an accompanying, non-binding resolution, also passed by a show of hands, MEPs voice alarm at continuing acts of violence against civilians, vulnerable groups and religious communities and call for tougher action by the Iraqi authorities against inter-ethnic violence.

Stronger EU presence in Iraq

The EU delegation in Baghdad must be fully operational to enable the EU to play a significant role in Iraq's transition, MEPs say. It must be properly staffed and have its own adequate premises and its head must have the necessary security cover to travel anywhere in the country in order to monitor EU-funded programmes, respect for hum
an rights and reform efforts.

Agreements Signed Today in Libreville to Halt Recent Rebellion in Central African Republic, Provide Map for Political Transition, Security Council Told

Peacebuilding Office Head Says Accords Call for Ceasefire, Unity Government;

Top Envoy on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Country’s UN Representative Also Speak

The Secretary-General’s Special Representative reported to the Security Council this morning that agreements, including a ceasefire, had just been signed in Libreville to contain the latest wave of rebellion in the Central African Republic and define the modalities for power sharing and political transition.

Speaking via videoconference, Margaret Vogt, who heads the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) — the latest configuration of a United Nations presence that dates back a decade — said the parties had agreed that President François Bozizé would remain in power, a Prime Minister from the opposition would be appointed, with full executive power, a Government of national unity would be established, and legislative elections would be organized within 12 months.

Also briefing the Council, in the chamber, was the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict.  The Central African Republic’s Permanent Representative also addressed the 15-member body.

Ms. Vogt said she was hopeful that the three accords — a declaration of principles to resolve the political and security crisis, a ceasefire agreement and a political agreement — would contain the immediate flare-up, but she warned of “another meltdown a few years down the line” if, like previous accords, they were not implemented.  Also crucial was clear investment in peace and development “to prevent [ Central African Republic] from falling down a slippery slope”.

As 2012 drew to a close, she said, a coalition of rebel groups had launched an offensive against the Government, basically overrunning half the country.  They had not faced much resistance from the national army, she said, attributing the failure to repel the aggression to the “depth of decay within the armed forces”.  The national army had lost cohesion and the will to fight, and many of the soldiers had “simply dropped their weapons and melted into the bushes”.

In the face of that inability to act, the international community had decided to pull out its personnel, which “drove home to the regional leaders the critical security challenges in the [Central African Republic]” and the need to secure Bangui, she said.  Subregional leaders responded quickly with troop reinforcements; South Africa deployed troops to Bangui, and France beefed up its forces.  Newly deployed troops were mandated to aggressively defend their positions and Bangui, and the Mission for the consolidation of peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX), led by the Economic Community of Central African States, had halted its plans to pull out.

Ms. Vogt, meanwhile, said she had embarked on intensive diplomatic efforts, and contrary to scepticism and the insistence by the rebel groups and political opposition that President Bozizé had lost all legitimacy, peace talks had begun, with all parties at the table.  Regional leaders appeared determined not to allow rebel overrun of the country and to prevent a forceful removal of a democratically elected Government.  They were equally hard on President Bozizé for his lack of openness.  Backed into a corner, he had been forced to concessions and to fulfil his promise to establish a national unity Government, she said.

BINUCA had not anticipated the scope or pace of the rebel assault, she acknowledged, but noted that it had reported on divisions within the national army and political leadership, partly engendered by rumours that the President planned to change the Constitution to remain in power beyond the end of his mandate, in 2016.  It also knew that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, which was to have begun in January 2013, would not benefit all fighting forces in the north-east, where there was scant Government presence.  Such an exercise in that area would need a regional approach involving neighbouring countries.

She felt that the dramatic events of the past week presented opportunities to “get the partners to dialogue and to consult on how to pull the country back from the brink”.  The opportunity must be seized to put in place an effective Government capable of addressing the country’s myriad challenges.

Follow-up to the first Libreville Agreement, as well as the inclusive political dialogue, had stalled, the country had become an “aid orphan”, and many of BINUCA’s core activities remained underfunded, she said.  Thus, she recommended that BINUCA lead a strategic assessment of priorities and needs, and the international community engage more forcefully, both diplomatically and financially, in the situation.

Topping the list of priorities was a functional and effective army and security force, and a State presence throughout the territory, she said.  Also important was to pair disarmament, demobilization and reintegration with robust political engagement on the ground and within the region.  Also, the Bretton Woods institutions should be engaged to cover post-conflict reconstruction and recovery.

Describing the Central African Republic a “forgotten conflict”, Special Representative Zainab Bangura recalled her fact-finding mission to the country, from 5 to 13 December 2012, to see first-hand the challenges to tackling conflict-related sexual violence.  The outbreak of violence had accentuated the need to implement the immediate protection commitments expressed in the two communiqués signed recently between Ms. Vogt and the Central African Republic Government.

“At this critical moment, the international community must send a strong and unequivocal message that sexual violence is unacceptable and those who commit, command or condone such crimes will be held to account,” she said.

Her visits to and meetings with women and children, and national and local non-governmental organizations, in Bangui and the towns of Bria and Paoua revealed that both State and non-state actors, as well as the Lord’s Resistance Army, were committing widespread sexual violence against women and that such violence was a fundamental security issue in need of an operational security response, she said.  Women and girls were being raped and abducted, forced into sexual slavery and marriage.  The situation was exacerbated by a deep “culture of silence” and denial fuelled by stigma and a “culture of acceptance”.

The acute lack of comprehensive information on the character and scope of the violations made it difficult to assess and monitor the situation, punish perpetrators and aid victims, she said.  Obtaining such information was critical.  She also urged all armed forces and groups in the Central African Republic to issue clear orders regarding sexual violence through their respective chains of command, and investigate and hold perpetrators to account.  They must also release women and children who had been forcibly recruited into the armed services.

“These protection measures must be prerequisite elements of any new ceasefire agreement,” she said.  “Sexual violence must be included as part of the definition of the ceasefire; and sexual violence crimes should be monitored as part of the subsequent ceasefire monitoring arrangement or mechanism.”

While the 2008 Libreville Agreement made reference to human rights, none of the more than 100 recommendations emerging from the peace dialogue focused on human rights obligations and accountability for violations, she said.  In meetings with her, representatives of the politico-military groups expressed a willingness to address sexual violence concerns.  It was crucial to hold them to their word so that such commitments were not just “paper promises”. 

She recounted how during her visit to Bria, the Convention des Patriotes pour la justice et la paix (CPJP) national rebel group, had agreed to release children in its custody to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).  But, the day before the handover, most of the identified children were moved 30 kilometres from the handover location.  Child protection teams were only able to access one boy and two girls.  In the end, CPJP’s cadres on the ground refused to release the two girls, which they claimed were “wives” of combatants.  That incident illustrated the special challenges to securing the release of women and girls from armed groups.

United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations were struggling to work in a context of continued insecurity, she said.  Few, if any, social services existed in the countryside.  The local hospital in Paoua, which served 200,000 people, only had one doctor, and only one qualified lawyer was based outside of country’s capital.  Despite several steps, including important legislative reforms to address sexual violence, national institutions were ill-equipped and State authority and structures were absent in most areas outside Bangui. 

She argued for a more strategic, concerted regional approach to the Central African Republic.  Leaders and combatants of many of the politico-military groups had connections to Chad and were of Chadian origin.  That challenged the sense of ownership and their commitment to the peace process.  Her fact-finding trip aimed to deepen dialogue and cooperation with the Bangui Government to help it create national ownership, leadership and responsibility.

Ms. Bangura was working to ensure deployment to the Central African Republic in February or March of a team of rule of law experts to help BINUCA and the United Nations country team prepare an implementation strategy and plan to end sexual violence, pursuant to the Joint Communiqués.  She urged the Council and Member States to prioritize and support deployment of a women protection adviser to BINUCA to help Ms. Vogt implement Council resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1960 (2010) and the Joint Communiqués.  She encouraged the Organization, particularly through the UN Action Network, to once again focus on advocacy and programmes to aid sexual violence victims in the Central African Republic and to monitor and report on violations.  A greater global focus, more sustained donor aid and an integrated response were urgently needed.

Charles-Armel Doubane of the Central African Republic, welcomed the progress achieved, and said that, despite continuing difficulties, his Government had been establishing the rule of law until the offensive.  However, by then, the international community was showing signs of fatigue; the videoconference with Ms. Vogt had reflected that fact.  She had been governing from Yaounde, Cameroon’s capital, and not from Bangui, and had submitted her report from Libreville.

The Government and people of his country were tired of the instability and insecurity caused by the abusive and easy use of the rifle to settle disputes, among other aspects of the situation, he declared.  “Together we have said that we finally understand.”  The recent meeting of Heads of State of the Economic Community of Central African States discussed how to facilitate the Libreville Agreement and address challenges to implementing it.

Everyone was now convinced that the Libreville Agreement was “the only lifeline for the Central African Republic,” he said.  The fact that the people of Central African Republic and the entire international community favoured dialogue gave hope that the new Agreement would be put into practice.  The signing of the Agreement had eased tensions somewhat.  His Government was committed to follow-up and implementation of its recommendations and decisions.  Parties were committed to national reconciliation.  He thanked all, who despite many challenges, had continued to support Central African Republic’s search for peace and stability.

For its consideration of the situation, the Council had before it today the latest report of the Secretary-General, issued on 21 December 2012, in which he recommends renewal of BINUCA’s mandate for another year, until 31 January 2014 (document S/2012/956).  Its current mandate is set to expire on 31 January.

General Assembly Concludes Main Part of Session Following Consensus in Fifth Committee on Member State Contributions to Regular, Peacekeeping Budgets

Assembly President Says Implementation of Agreements Should Be Seen

‘As a Core Principal of Effective Multilateralism in the Twenty-First Century’

The General Assembly this evening — resuming a meeting suspended on Friday pending agreement by its Budget Committee — concluded the main part of its sixty-seventh session with the adoption of 22 texts, two of which set the rates Member States will pay for the regular and peacekeeping budgets over the next three years.

Noting that the more than 300 draft resolutions and decisions adopted since September ran the gamut of contemporary global challenges, Assembly President Vuk Jeremić told delegations on Friday, 21 December, that “what happens in one part of the world invariably affects us all”.  It was with that in mind, he said, that he had chosen “bringing about adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations by peaceful means” as the session’s overarching theme.  “In these tumultuous times, the enormity of this challenge is evident,” he said.

He asked States to consistently implement what had been agreed: “doing so should be seen by all Member States as a core principle of effective multilateralism in the twenty-first century”.  It was only the conduct and dedication of States that would determine the future strength of the Assembly.

Capping days of intense negotiations, the Assembly adopted a range of Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) resolutions, covering the scale of assessing Member States’ dues, the United Nations pension system and the proposed 2013 budget for 33 political missions.

By one consensus text, the Assembly retained the existing formula for assessing Member States’ financial contributions to the United Nations regular budget and its peacekeeping operations during the 2013-2015 period.  It kept in place the existing elements for the regular budget, including the average statistical base period of three to six years, a country’s gross national income (GNI) converted to United States dollars using market exchange rates, and its population size.  It also maintained the 0.01 per cent ceiling for assessing the rate of least developed countries and the 22 per cent maximum assessment rate for everyone else.

Concerning peacekeeping assessments — where each Member State is assigned to 1 of 10 levels, with corresponding discount rates — the Assembly adopted a consensus text, taking note of updates to those levels, as suggested by the Secretary-General.  By further terms, it endorsed those updates subject to certain provisions, and used them establish Member States’ fees for the period 2013‑2015.  Recognizing the need for reform, the Assembly decided to review the structure of the assessment scale during its seventieth session.

Though not tasked with passing a budget this year, the Assembly adopted a consensus text revising expenditures upwards by $243.26 million to $5.39 billion, and income by $3.99 million to $511.74 million for the current biennium.  The Secretary-General’s proposed budget for 33 special political missions also came under scrutiny, with the Assembly approving $566.48 million to keep them running in 2013.

On the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund, the Assembly adopted a consensus text increasing the mandatory retirement age to 65 for new participants effective no later than 1 January 2014, and amending Fund regulations to allow for the recovery of pension entitlements from staff who defrauded participating employers.

Other Budget Committee texts addressed post-adjustment payment for staff, the financing for the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia, as well as the Residual Mechanism, funding for the enterprise resource planning system and the internal justice system, and funding for commitments made at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development.

Acting on two outstanding texts of its Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural), the Assembly adopted — without a vote for the first time — a resolution on the human rights situation in Myanmar, welcoming the positive developments in the country and the Government’s commitment to continue political reform, democratization and national reconciliation.

At the same time, it urged Myanmar to continue the release of political prisoners without delay and ensure the full restoration of their rights.  It expressed concern about arbitrary detention, forced displacement and rape, urging an end to such violations.  Elsewhere, it urged accelerated efforts to address violence affecting ethnic minorities, expressing concern about the Rohingya minority in Rakhine State.

The Assembly also adopted a consensus resolution on the Committee against Torture, authorizing that Committee — without prejudice to the Assembly’s intergovernmental process on treaty body strengthening — to meet for an additional week per session as a temporary measure, with effect from May 2013 until the end of November 2014, to address the report backlog.

On the recommendation of its First Committee (Disarmament and International Security), the Assembly adopted an updated text on the arms trade treaty by a recorded vote of 133 in favour to none against, with 17 abstentions. (See Annex III.) By its terms, it decided to convene in New York, from 18 to 28 March 2013, the Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, to be governed by the rules of procedure adopted on 3 July 2012.  It also decided that the text of the treaty submitted by the Conference President on 26 July 2012 would be the basis for future work, without prejudice to the right of delegates to put forward proposals on that text.  The text passed after votes on its operative paragraphs 2 and 3.

In other business, the Assembly elected Malaysia, Brazil and Peru to the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission to serve two-year terms beginning on 1 January 2013, with two seats yet to be filled.  It appointed Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal to the Committee on Conferences to serve three-year terms beginning on 1 January 2013, with five seats remaining vacant.

The Assembly also extended terms for judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia through the adoption of two more texts.

Explanations of vote were made by the representatives of Saudi Arabia, Monaco, Oman, Cuba (also on behalf of Bolivia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ecuador and Iran), Iran and Syria.

A representative of the Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See also spoke in explanation of vote.

The representative of the Russian Federation introduced an amendment to a draft.  The delegate from Cyprus requested that it be put to a recorded vote.

The Fifth Committee Rapporteur introduced that body’s reports.

The representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exercised the right of reply.

Action on Committee Texts

The Assembly today first took up reports of the Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural), which had been pending, owing to consideration by the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) of their programme budget implications.

Acting without a vote, the Assembly adopted draft resolution XVI on “the Committee against Torture” contained in Third Committee report A/67/457/Add.2.

The Assembly turned next to draft resolution I on “human rights situation in Myanmar” (document A/67/457/Add.3), by which it would welcome the positive developments in the country and the Government’s commitment to continue political reform, democratization and national reconciliation.

Speaking before the vote on that text, the representative of Saudi Arabia said his delegation would join consensus.  His Government supported the progress being made in Myanmar and the commitments of its Government towards political reform, human rights protection and national reconciliation, among others.  The Rohingya Muslim minority had endured tragic circumstances manifested in a policy of harassment and violence, and Saudi Arabia stressed that full rights should be accorded to that minority, including, among others, citizenship and political rights.  He called for full access to humanitarian assistance for the affected persons and groups, regardless of race or religion, adding that his country had contributed $50 million towards helping those victims.

He noted that after the vote on the text in the Third Committee, the Myanmar delegation had expressed strong reservations to the term “Rohingya minority”.  That did not serve the aspiration to reach a peaceful settlement to Myanmar’s oppressed minority and was a negative indicator against the international community’s consensus.  His Government would continue monitoring the situation with hopes that Myanmar’s Government would cooperate fully with the international community towards achieving justice for the Rohingya Muslim minority.

The Assembly then adopted, for the first time without a vote, the draft resolution on the human rights situation in Myanmar.

Next, the Assembly turned to draft resolution IV contained in the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) report on the arms trade treaty (document A/67/409), also pending due to consideration by the Fifth Committee of budget implications.  It concerned building on progress made so far towards the adoption of a strong, balanced and effective such treaty.

The Assembly first, in a separate recorded vote of 126 in favour to 1 against (Iran), with 21 abstentions, retained operative paragraph 2, thereby setting the dates for a final conference in 2013.  (For details of the vote, see Annex I.)

Next, operative paragraph 3, by which the Assembly decided that the treaty text submitted by the Conference President on 26 July would be the basis for future work, was retained by a recorded vote of 123 in favour to 1 against (Iran) with 24 abstentions (Annex II).  The resolution as a whole was adopted by a recorded vote of 133 in favour to none against, with 17 abstentions (Annex III).

Speaking after the vote, a representative of the Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See welcomed adoption of the arms treaty resolution, which he said “reignites hope”, after the unfortunate stalemate at the July conference.  The international community, he said, would have a legally binding instrument, but to achieve “such a noble goal”, it was necessary to have an open and transparent process that allowed for the full participation of all States.

He said his delegation understood the inclusion of “mutatis mutandis” in the present text and recognized it as a necessary change to rectify improper treatment of his delegation during the July conference.  The Holy See was to be fully recognized within the United Nations, in accordance with the rules of procedure.

Right of Reply

The delegate of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, taking the floor in exercise of the right of reply concerning the draft resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, rejected the allegations made against his country.  “ Israel has nuclear weapons and it is the major source of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East,” he said.  “It should know very clearly that its continued possession of nuclear weapons will eventually give rise to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, posing a threat to the regional peace and security.”  Further, the more Israel clung to its policies of continued possession of nuclear weapons, with the silent support of the United States, the more it would show itself as the “typical representative example of the double standards of the United States in the field of nuclear proliferation”.

Action on Fifth Committee Texts

Next, Fifth Committee Rapporteur JUSTIN KISOKA of the United Republic of Tanzania introduced its reports.  For further information on those texts, please see Press Release GA/AB/4057.

Acting without a vote, the Assembly adopted draft resolutions on financial reports and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors (document A/C.5/67/L.8); programme planning (document A/C.5/67/L.10) and pattern of conferences (document A/C.5/67/L.5).

It next turned to a draft resolution on scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations (document A/C.5/67/L.6), adopting it without a vote.

Speaking before the text’s adoption, the representative of Monaco explained that her country had joined in the consensus on paragraph 6.  However, it had seen its assessments jump by 300 per cent from 2013 to 2015.  The methodology used had resulted in a distortion in evaluating Monaco’s capacity to pay.  Despite the enormous increase, however, her Government reiterated its commitment to comply fully with its international obligations and to honour its payment on time.

The Assembly then adopted without a vote a draft resolution on scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations peacekeeping operations (document A/C.5/67/L.7).

Explaining his position, the representative of Oman said that, while his country had joined the consensus, consideration should be given to the fact that there was no justification for raising the level for Oman’s to “level B”.  In view of all objective criteria, Oman should be at the same level of developing countries where the per capita income had increased gradually and nominally.  The level at which Oman had been put was a level that included all developed countries, while Oman remained a developing State.  He was not pleased with the “sudden move to level B”.

Moving on, the Assembly adopted without a vote a draft decision on the United Nations common system (document A/C.5/67/L.14), and draft resolutions on the United Nations pension system (document A/C.5/67/L.9), administration of justice at the United Nations (document A/C.5/67/L.11) and financing of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (document A/C.5/67/L.15).

Before taking action on the draft resolution on financing of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (document A/C.5/67/L.16), the delegation of the Russian Federation said that there had not been time to properly verify the figures that had emerged on financing the tribunals.  The Secretariat had assured his delegation that subsequent amendments regarding financing would be provided in an informal way.  Unfortunately, it had not been possible to achieve consensus on the financing for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.  The Russian Federation had shown flexibility, he said, yet even its modified proposals were not reflected in the text submitted by the Committee Chair.  In his view, he said, double standards and a politicized approach were adopted with respect to the finance and technical issues.  He urged completion of the Tribunal’s work and the transfer of its remaining functions to the Residual Mechanism, in line with the relevant Security Council resolutions.  He had been pressed to propose oral amendments.

Following a request by the representative of Cyprus for a recorded vote on the amendments, the Assembly voted 59 against to 17 in favour, with 65 abstentions, thereby rejecting the proposal (Annex IV).  The draft resolution as a whole was then adopted by a recorded vote of 139 in favour to none against, with 12 abstentions (Annex V).

Acting without a vote, the Assembly adopted draft resolutions on financing of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (document A/C.5/67/L.17) and on financing of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (document A/C.5/67/L.4).

The Assembly turned next to the two draft resolutions contained in the report of the Fifth Committee on the programme budget for the biennium 2012-2013 (documents A/C.5/67/L.18 and A/C.5/67/L.19). 

Explaining its position before action on the first draft, Cuba’s delegate, also on behalf of Bolivia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Iran, said the programme budget for 2012-2013 included estimates on special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly or Security Council.  The delegations were concerned at the inclusion of financial resources related to the activities of the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the responsibility to protect, as the General Assembly “has not legislated” that concept or defined it.  The delegations were concerned that the budget did not allow them to identify the level of resources related to the responsibility to protect within the overall level of funds requested for the Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide.  That inclusion did not help to reach agreement with regard to the budgetary estimates for that thematic group.  The delegations, therefore, considered it necessary to call for a recorded vote on section I of the draft resolution.

The representative of Iran said his country had always supported the United Nations in the scope of its work as long as it abided by international law.  However, the issue of the responsibility to protect was still under consideration by the General Assembly.  There was no reason to fund posts about which there was no definition, he said, and that was why his country would vote “no” on section I.

Section I was then retained by a recorded vote of 113 in favour to 12 against, with 22 abstentions (Annex VI).  The draft resolution as a whole was adopted without a vote, as was draft resolution II.

The representative of Syria, speaking after the vote, said his country had voted in favour of the draft text concerning financing for special political missions; however, he had reservations about the allocation of certain resources.  Special Envoy Terje Roed-Larsen had exceeded his mandate by following up on matters of two States, Lebanon and Syria, while he blatantly favoured Israel.  His delegation had joined the consensus on the programme budget for the biennium; however, regarding revised estimates for the Human Rights Council, he again expressed reservations on resources for two positions related to that matter.

Next, the Assembly took up the item on review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations (, adopting without a vote the draft resolution on the proposed programme budget outline for the biennium 2014-2015 (document A/C.5/67/L.13), as well as a draft decision on questions deferred for future consideration (document A/C.5/67/L.20).

Also acting without a vote, the Assembly adopted a resolution, under its agenda item 139, on administrative and budgetary coordination of the United Nations with the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Other Business

The General Assembly then filled three of five vacancies on the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission, as follows: Brazil, Malaysia and Peru for two-year terms beginning on 1 January 2013.

Turning to the appointment of members of the Committee on Conferences, the Assembly appointed Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal to three-year terms beginning on 1 January 2013.

The Assembly next adopted without a vote a draft decision  to extend the terms of five judges on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (document A/67/L.51), as follows: Mehmet Güney (Turkey), Khalida Rachid Khan (Pakistan), Arlette Ramaroson (Madagascar), Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov (Russian Federation) and Andrésia Vaz (Senegal), who are members of the tribunal’s Appeals Chamber, until 31 December 2014 or until the completion of the cases to which they are assigned, whichever comes first.

Also acting without a vote, it adopted a draft decision to extend the terms of 21 judges on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (document A/67/L.52), as follows: Appeals Chamber Judges Carmel Agius (Malta), Liu Daqun (China), Theodor Meron (United States), Fausto Pocar (Italy) and Patrick Robinson (Jamaica) until 31 December 2013; permanent Trial Chambers Judges Jean-Claude Antonetti (France), Guy Delvoie (Belgium), Burton Hall (Bahamas), Christoph Flügge (Germany), O-Gon Kwon (Republic of Korea), Bakone Justice Moloto (South Africa), Howard Morrison (United Kingdom) and Alphons Orie (Netherlands) until 31 December 2013; and ad litem Trial Chamber Judges Elizabeth Gwaunza (Zimbabwe), Michèle Picard (France), Árpád Prandler (Hungary) and Stefan Trechsel (Switzerland) until 1 June 2013, and Melville Baird (Trinidad and Tobago), Flavia Lattanzi (Italy), Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua (Democratic Republic of the Congo)and Frederik Harhoff (Denmark) until 31 December 2013.

Closing Statement by General Assembly on 21 December

Reviewing achievements made during the main part of the General Assembly’s sixty-seventh session, VUK JEREMIĆ, President of the General Assembly, spotlighted the adoption by the plenary, of, thus far, 231 resolutions and 63 decisions.  Highlights included texts on human rights improvement, freedom of religion or belief, combating intolerance, strengthening the United Nations disarmament machinery and a so-called “humanitarian omnibus resolution”.

However, he said, the issue that had perhaps drawn the most attention was the “historic” vote held on 29 November on granting the State of Palestine non-Member Observer State status in the United Nations.  As those votes were cast, the President had extended an appeal to the Assembly — and to Palestine and Israel in particular — to work for peace with the aim of reaching a comprehensive settlement.  “Today, allow me to call again for a just peace in the holy land,” he said.

Indeed, in today’s globalizing, interconnected world, “what happens in one part of the world invariably affects us all”.  It was with that in mind that he had chosen “bringing about adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations by peaceful means” as the overarching theme for the sixty-seventh session, he said, adding that, “in these tumultuous times, the enormity of this challenge is evident”.

Mr. Jeremić had opened the meeting informing the Assembly that negotiations had fallen short on a draft resolution to set up the Open-Ended Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals, and that a decision on the matter — one of the main outcomes of the Rio+20 Conference — would have to be postponed until a later date.  When he turned to sustainable development during his closing statement, he said he would not be sharing the longer portion of his statement that he had prepared on that topic.

“I have certain strong beliefs which I am no longer prepared to share with this audience,” he stressed in that regard.  He personally believed that such a discussion was critical to the future of humankind, and hoped that such views would be “reflected in decisions we might make in this chamber”.  However, before such decisions or agreements occurred, he was no longer prepared to speak in public about sustainable development.

Turning to other matters, he said that, over the past few years, the Group of 20 (G-20) had come to play an increasingly important role in the debate on how to improve global economic governance.  “I believe the General Assembly, which operates on the basis of the sovereign equality principle, can provide a unique platform to exchange views and share information on shared economic concerns,” he said, announcing his intention to launch a process that would lead to the establishment of a non-intrusive form of regularized interaction between the Assembly and the G-20.

The intent of that initiative was not to infringe on established prerogatives, but to complement existing international efforts, in accordance with the G-20’s outreach to countries not in the collective and the United Nations, he explained.  In addition, he would organize a thematic debate on ways to enhance dialogue between the G‑20 “and the rest of the world”.

Among other high-level thematic debates that would be convened in the months ahead would be one in partnership with the Organization of American States (OAS) on social inequality, one on the “role of international criminal justice in reconciliation” and another on “culture and development”.  A thematic session would be devoted to examining “tools for peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa”, and a thematic debate would be held on “climate change, green energy and water sustainability”.  In addition, a thematic session would be held on the International Year of Water Cooperation, among other topics.

While those themes merited the significant attention of the Assembly, Member States must also endeavour to consistently implement what had already been agreed.  “Doing so should be seen by all Member States as a core principle of effective multilateralism in the twenty-first century,” he said.  It was only the conduct and dedication of States that would determine the future strength of the Assembly, he emphasized.

ANNEX I

Vote on Operative Paragraph 2, Arms Trade Treaty

Operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution on the arms trade treaty (document A/67/409) was retained by a recorded vote of 126 in favour to 1 against, with 21 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Zambia.

Against:  Iran.

Abstain:  Bahrain, Bolivia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Myanmar, Namibia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen.

Absent:  Angola, Azerbaijan, Belize, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mozambique, Nauru, Paraguay, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe.

ANNEX II

Vote on Operative Paragraph 3, Arms Trade Treaty

Operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution on the arms trade treaty (document A/67/409) was retained by a recorded vote of 123 in favour to 1 against, with 24 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Zambia.

Against:  Iran.

Abstain:  Bahrain, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen.

Absent:  Angola, Azerbaijan, Belize, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mozambique, Nauru, Paraguay, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe.

ANNEX III

Vote on Arms Trade Treaty draft as a whole

The draft resolution on the Arms Trade Treaty (document A/67/409) was adopted by a recorded vote of 133 in favour to none against, with 17 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Zambia.

Against:  None.

Abstain:  Bahrain, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen.

Absent:  Angola, Azerbaijan, Belize, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mozambique, Nauru, Paraguay, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe.

ANNEX IV

Vote on Oral Amendment to Financing for Former Yugoslavia Tribunal

An oral amendment to the draft resolution on the financing for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (document A/67/675) was rejected by a recorded vote of 59 against to 17 in favour, with 65 abstentions, as follows:

Against:  Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay.

In favour:  Belarus, Bolivia, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Kazakhstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Serbia, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Abstain:  Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen.

Absent:  Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belize, Benin, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mozambique, Nauru, Nepal, Palau, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Viet Nam.

ANNEX V

Vote on International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Financing

The draft resolution as a whole on the financing for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (document A/67/675) was adopted by a recorded vote of 139 in favour to none against, with 12 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia.

Against:  None.

Abstain:  Belarus, Bolivia, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Syria, Venezuela.

Absent:  Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belize, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mozambique, Nauru, Palau, Paraguay, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe.

ANNEX VI

Vote on Section I, Draft on Programme Budget for Biennium 2012-2013

Section I of the draft resolution on questions relating to the Programme Budget for the Biennium 2012-2013 (document A/67/677) was retained by a recorded vote of 113 in favour to 12 against, with 22 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Yemen.

Against:  Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Iran, Nicaragua, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Venezuela, Zambia.

Abstain:  Barbados, Belarus, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, China, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Fiji, Haiti, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Papua New Guinea, Russian Federation, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Togo, Zimbabwe.

Absent:  Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belize, Bhutan, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mozambique, Nauru, Pakistan, Palau, Paraguay, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu.